dinsdag 9 augustus 2011

Bahrain Reform: Promise & Reality

Bahrain Reform: Promise & Reality
By J.E. Peterson
In Joshua Teitelbaum ed.
Political Liberalization of the Persian Gulf
Columbia University Press
p. 157-185


The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain

The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain

Laurence Louer
Sciences Po./Center for International Studies & Research (CERI) Paris

City & Society
Vol. 20, No. 1
p. 32-53
American Anthropological Association

This paper shows that, in Bahrain, the main political consequence of migration has been the deepening of state/society conflict. While having old historical roots, this conflict has been fostered in the recent period by the collapse of the “caste system” that, since the 1970s, used to regulate the relations between foreigners
and nationals in the labor market by preventing the two groups from being in competition for jobs. I conclude that in order to evaluate the possible political impact of migration in the Gulf States, one has to look first at the structure of the relation between the national population and the migrants, rather than focus on the number of foreigners. [Keywords: Bahrain, governance, migrants, Shia, political

Labor Movements in Bahrain

Labor Movements in Bahrain

Abd ul-Hadi Khalaf
Merip Reports


Migrant Labor and the Politics of Development in Bahrain

Migrant Labor and the Politics of Development in Bahrain

By Rob Franklin
Merip Reports


The Victory of Al Wefaq: The Rise of Shiite Politics

The Victory of Al Wefaq: The Rise of Shiite Politics

By Mohammed Zahid Mahjoob Zweiri
Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

Research Paper No. 108
April 2007
Research Institute for European and American Studies


Women and Social Change in Bahrain

Women and Social Change in Bahrain
By May Seikaly
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
26 (1994) 415-426


Response of British Army about UK engagement in Bahrain

Response of the British Armed Forces about UK's defense training engagement with Bahrain from an e-mail sent by Nishma Doshi from February 20th 2011, answered on April 21st 2011 by Chris Millward, Land Forces Secretariat. 


A Human Rights Report on Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and Children

A Human Rights Report on Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and Children

Report by The Protection Project
March 2002


Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy


Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
March 21, 2011
Congress Research Service
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of the Congress


Protests that erupted in Bahrain following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by previous efforts to include the Shiite majority in governance. Possibly because of concerns that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could jeopardize the extensive U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain, the Obama Administration criticized the early use of violence by the government but subsequently praised the Al Khalifa regime for its offer of a dialogue with the demonstrators. It did not call for the King to step down, and Administration contacts with his government are widely credited for the decision of the regime to cease using force against the protesters as of February 19, 2011. However, as protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain’s government, contrary to the advice of the Obama Administration, invited security assistance from other neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council countries and subsequently moved to end the large gatherings. Some believe the crackdown has largely ended prospects for a negotiated political solution in Bahrain, and could widen the conflict to the broader Gulf region.

The 2011 unrest, in which some opposition factions have escalated their demands in response to the initial use of force by the government, comes four months after the October 23, 2010, parliamentary election. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have unseated the ruling Al Khalifa family from power, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in the elected lower house could give it greater authority. In advance of the elections, the
government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hard-line Shiite leadership as tools of Iran. On the other hand, Bahrain’s Shiite oppositionists, and many outside experts, accuse the government of inflating the intensity of contacts between Iran and the
opposition in order to justify the use of force against Bahraini Shiites.

Unrest in Bahrain directly affects U.S. national security interests. Bahrain, in exchange for a tacit U.S. security guarantee, has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of
personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahraini facilities have been pivotal to U.S. strategy to deter any Iranian aggression as well as to interdict the movement of terrorists and weapons-related technology on Gulf waterways. The United States has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the Persian Gulf states, collectively.

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is generally poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, in large part because Bahrain has largely run out of crude oil reserves. It has tried to compensate through diversification, particularly in the banking sector and some
manufacturing. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).